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Abstract
We study customers’ and brands’ preferences
towards public and private customer service
interactions on social media. Using a natural
experiment where the ease of private communication
with a brand is exogenously and significantly increased,
we found that complaining customers prefer to do so
publicly while some non-complaining customers prefer
to communicate privately. However, through a
randomized field experiment, we found that firms
prioritize complaints received from the private channel
over complaints received from the public channel.
Therefore, brands, well aware of the risk of subjecting
its customer service under public scrutiny, prefer
complaints communicated privately and seem to nudge
customers towards switching back to the traditional
mode of customer service where all interactions are
private. The divergent preferences towards open voice
and private message suggest a hidden tug of war
between the traditional delivery of customer service
featuring brand control and social media customer
service featuring transparency and openness.

1. Introduction
How do we respond when the perceived quality of
a good or service is below our expectation? Hirschman
[15] argues that there are essentially two responses: exit,
that is, to discontinue the relation, or voice, that is, to
repair through the communication of complaint or
proposal for change. Hirschman’s theory of exit and
voice provides a unifying conceptual framework to
understanding economic and political actions people
may take when something goes wrong with the
operation of an organization. To reduce exits, it is
crucial that customers or the public can easily
communicate their complaints and suggestions.
Therefore, delivering customer service or offering
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people a voicing channel has always been an essential
part of any business in a market economy or any
government in a democratic society.
Conceptually, we can further distinguish two types
of voices: private voice, which refers to voices solely
communicated with the responsible party and not visible
to the general public, and public voice, which refers to
voices communicated with the responsible party but
also visible to the general public. Unlike the political
context where public voicing and debate is common,
most of the customer service interaction in the business
context is private, whether the customer service is
delivered in person, by phone, through email, or more
recently, via chatbot. This distinction, however, is
starting to disappear with the emergence of social media
customer service. Nowadays, companies routinely
respond to and sometimes address customer complaints
publicly on social media platforms such as Facebook
and Twitter [14]. For example, on Twitter, a disgruntled
customer can publicly complain to a brand by
mentioning the official account name of a brand with the
symbol @. The brand typically replies to the customer
publicly on Twitter as well. If there is a need to
exchange sensitive information, they can use direct
message (i.e., DM) on Twitter to communicate privately.
From the perspective of customers, the new option
of publicly complaining to a brand clearly empowers
them, especially for those with large social media
influence. Indeed, there are reports that dissatisfied
customers only had their issues resolved after they
switched from the traditional customer service via
phone line to the social media customer service. 1
Moreover, social psychology theory suggests that when
people perceive themselves as being treated unfairly,
there is an inherent need to restore the emotional balance
[9]. Publicly venting about the brand is often an
effective and efficient way of achieving such a balance.
Given these benefits, we conjecture that customers who
complain through social media will prefer to voice
publicly. On the other hand, for customers who merely
seek some information from the firm, it is possible that
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some of them prefer the private channel because of the
comfort of privacy. To evaluate these conjectures, we
use a natural experiment (from the perspective of
customers) in 2016 when Delta Air Lines adopted
OpenDM on Twitter, a new feature that allows anyone
to send a private message to Delta Air Lines on Twitter
without first being followed by or following Delta. To
Delta’s customers, this sudden availability of OpenDM
exogenously and dramatically increased the ease of
using private channel to communicate their complaints.
Indeed, with OpenDM, there is no real difference in
terms of the convenience between complaining publicly
on Twitter or privately through direct message. If all
customers who complain to the brand on social media
prefer to do so publicly, we should not expect any
statistically significant drop in the number of public
complaints after the adoption of OpenDM, everything
else equal. On the other hand, if some non-complaining
customers (e.g., information seeking) prefer to
communicate privately with the brand, we should expect
a statistically significant drop in the number of noncomplaints communicated to the brand publicly,
everything else equal. To summarize, we propose the
following two hypotheses for empirical testing:
Hypothesis 1A: There is no statistically significant
change in the number of publicly communicated
complaints before and after the adoption of OpenDM,
everything else equal.
Hypothesis 1B: There is a drop in the number of
publicly communicated non-complaints after the
adoption of OpenDM, everything else equal.
The clear benefits for consumers to have this public
customer service channel, aided by the ubiquity of smart
phones and social media technology, perhaps explains
the growing popularity of firms delivering customer
service through social media platforms such as Twitter
and Facebook. However, from a brand’s perspective,
there are both direct benefits and risk associated with
this new customer service channel. By publicly
responding to a complaining customer, rather than
ignoring the complaint, the brand is publicly
demonstrating its willingness and effort to correct its
mistake, which may potentially serve as a positive
marketing message. However, by subjecting its
customer service under public scrutiny, the brand also
risks failing to respond to or address a complaint
publicly, which may further trigger additional
complaints and criticisms. Recent research suggests that
most customers who received customer service through
social media actually felt the same or worse after their
interactions with the brand [12]. Hence, it is likely that
for a typical brand, the risk of delivering customer
service on social media outweighs the direct benefit of
doing so, but shunning away from this new channel is
likely an even worse strategy because the avoidance can
signal the brand’s lack of confidence or openness,

especially if its competitors or firms in other industries
are already delivering customer service via social media.
Given this dilemma, we conjecture that firms will prefer
to deliver social media customer service as privately as
possible. For example, on Twitter, firms may promote
or incentivize, directly or indirectly, the use of direct
messaging for customers to voice their complaints. By
keeping complaints and conversations private, firms
essentially turn social media customer service into yet
another form of traditional customer service akin to
customer service through email, albeit in a more
efficient way. Therefore, we propose the following two
hypotheses for empirical testing:
Hypothesis 2A: Firms are more likely to respond
to customer complaints communicated privately than to
complaints communicated publicly.
Hypothesis 2B: Firms are more likely to respond
faster to customer complaints communicated privately
than to complaints communicated publicly.
To test these two hypotheses, we resort to a
randomized field experiment on a popular social media
platform where similar complaining messages are
communicated to firms through either a public or a
private channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: after
briefly reviewing the literature in the next section, we
first present the natural experiment to test Hypotheses
1A and 1B. Then, we present the randomized field
experiment to test Hypotheses 2A and 2B. Finally, we
conclude the paper by summarizing the contributions
and limitations of this research.

2. Literature Review
Our research is broadly related to the vast literature
on consumer complaint behavior and is most closely
related to the small stream of literature on customers’
choice of complaint channels.
Consumer Complaint Behavior (CCB). Complaints
often result from a disparity between consumers’
expectations in the pre-purchase stage and
disconfirmation in the post-purchase stage [6]. Different
causes of product failure may lead to different forms of
complaints such as demanding a refund or an exchange
for the product, or an apology from the firm [10]. Postpurchase complaints include consumer-initiated
communication to marketers, their channel members, or
public agencies, to obtain remedy or restitution for
purchase or usage-related problems [19]. Firms
regularly provide services to address complaints and
dissatisfaction, and firms’ successful remedial actions—
such as providing refund, exchange, or repair—may be
able to help retain customers [4]; meanwhile, firms’
inappropriate handling of customers’ redress can lead to
negative word-of-mouth and damage businesses [3].
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Consumer Complaint Channel. Day and Landon [8]
categorized actions by dissatisfied consumers into
public actions—e.g., contacting the business to seek
redress or pursuing legal actions, and private actions—
e.g., boycotting the business or warning friends and
family. This taxonomy regarding the definition of public
and private complaints is largely followed by the
literature ([1, 13, 16, 17]). As is succinctly summarized
in Balaji et al. [1], “Under these definitions, public
complaints are complaints visible for the service
provider to see, while private complaints largely remain
undetected by the service provider.” The only
exceptions we found are Gregoire et al. [11] and
Breitsohl et al. [5]. In Gregoire et al. [11], private
complaining is implicitly defined as customers voicing
their concerns only to firms and public complaining is
implicitly defined as customers going beyond firms’
borders to alert the public about a service failure episode,
which is closest to how we define public voicing and
private voicing in the current paper. Mattila and Wirtz
[16] expanded Day and Landon [8] and found that
customers seeking tangible compensations prefer
interactive
channels
such
as
face-to-face
communication and phone calls, while those seeking to
vent their frustration prefer remote channels such as
letters and e-mails; Susskind [18] distinguished between
complaints directed to management from those directed
to line-level employees; Berry et al. [2] explicitly
studied the effect of customers’ personality on their
complaint channel choices. In this paper we consider

3. Study 1: Natural Experiment
To understand how customers choose between the
public channel and the private channel to communicate
with a brand on social media, we exploit a natural
experiment where the relative ease of using the private
channel is exogenously and dramatically increased. Our
empirical strategy relies on an institutional change
Twitter made in April 2015: Twitter started to provide
the option that allows users to opt in to receive direct
messages from anyone, regardless of whether the sender
and recipient were following each other.2 Specifically,
we exploit one exogenous shock generated by Delta Air
Line’s decision to enable any Twitter user to send direct
messages to them, which we refer to as the OpenDM
policy, to achieve causal identification. The OpenDM
policy can reduce the cost for Twitter users to contact
airlines, making DM an attractive customer service and
communication channel. Using this shock, we examine
2

https://techcrunch.com/2015/04/20/twitter-now-lets-you-opt-in-toreceive-direct-messages-from-anyone/ (Last access: June 7, 2018)
3
Note that airlines sometimes post tweets which aim to engage with
customers. For example, an airline company might ask customers to
tweet their favorite vacation destinations, and customers might tweet

whether there is any change in customers’ choice of
communication channel after airlines’ adoption of
OpenDM. As airlines sequentially enabled the OpenDM
functionality, we are able to causally identify the impact
of OpenDM by comparing airlines that just enabled
OpenDM with other airlines that did not change their
OpenDM setting—note that some airlines had already
enabled OpenDM prior to the shocks we observed, and
therefore we treat those airlines as the control group. In
the sections below we describe the data used in our
analysis and our empirical strategy.

3.1. Data
We obtain major U.S. airlines’ customer tweets
data from Jan 1, 2016 to July 21, 2016 through a social
media analytics company. We also monitored major U.S.
airlines’ Twitter accounts from Feb 1st, 2016 to June 30th,
2016 to see whether and when these airlines enabled the
OpenDM functionality. During this period we
successfully observed that Delta Air Lines enabled
OpenDM on March 31, 2016. The decision to enable
OpenDM was made by the airline itself, which is
perceived as an exogenous shock to the customers
attempting to contact the airlines. At the same time,
other major U.S. airlines including United Airlines,
American Airlines, and Southwest Airlines kept their
OpenDM functionality enabled throughout our
observation period. These major U.S. airlines serve as
the control group for Delta Air Lines as they operate in
similar markets and are comparable in size. Empirically,
we use a Difference-in-differences (DID) analysis to
examine how the customer tweets sent to Delta Air
Lines changed in response to its OpenDM adoption.
Specifically, we evaluate the impact of OpenDM from
the following perspectives: the changes in percentage of
complaint tweets, and the number of tweets received by
the airlines.

3.2. Measures
As customers and airlines sometimes engage in
back and forth conversations over multiple tweets
regarding a single issue, we first consolidate tweets into
distinct dialogues. Specifically, for each tweet in our
data set we are able to see if this tweet is responding to
an earlier tweet and, if it is, the ID of the tweet being
responded to. We use this information to trace and
construct sequences of tweets that belong to the same
dialogues between an airline and an individual customer.
Overall, our data set contains 770,705 customerinitiated dialogues.3

their replies at the airline company. As these airline-initiated
dialogues appear to be distinct from dialogues initiated by customers
seeking help, we focus only on customer-initiated dialogues in our
empirical analysis and exclude all airline-initiated dialogues.
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We adopt a supervised-learning approach to
classify whether a given tweet is a complaint or a noncomplaint. Operationally, we hired three annotators to
independently label around 3700 randomly selected
customer tweets. The inter-rater reliability measure
suggests there is a high level of agreement between the
three annotators (Fleiss’ Kappa = 0.721). We use the
labeled data to train a support vector machine (SVM)
classifier, which we then use to classify the first tweet
of each dialogue in our data set to determine whether a
given dialogue is a complaint. SVM is a widely used
machine learning method [7] that has demonstrated
strong performance in a variety of classification tasks.
The SVM classifier’s performance is shown in Table 1,
suggesting the classification performance is satisfactory.
The summary statistics of the main variables are shown
in Table 2.

3.3. Empirical Model
We treat Delta Air Lines’ decision to adopt
OpenDM as an exogenous shock to its customers. By
treating the OpenDM as an exogenous shock we are
assuming that customers are simply reacting to the
addition of DM rather than causing Delta to enable
OpenDM. This assumption is reasonable because
individual customers are unlikely to lead to Delta’s
adopting OpenDM. Therefore, customer tweets sent to
Delta Air Lines are considered to be in the treatment
group; meanwhile, since other major U.S. airlines did
not change their OpenDM policy during this time period,
we treat customer tweets sent to other airlines as the
control group. The treatment and control groups allow
us to specify a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model
to examine the effect of OpenDM on customers’
tweeting behavior. 4 Specifically, we construct a panel
data set where, for each airline, we observe the daily
number of tweets this airline received during our
observation period. The linear regression function for
our DID analysis is as follows:
y𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑇𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗
+ 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 + 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 ,
𝜖𝑗𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎1 ),
where y𝑗𝑡 is the logarithm-transformed number of
tweets airline j received on day t. 𝑇𝑗 is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if airline j is Delta Air Lines. 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 is a
dummy variable5 indicating whether day t is after Delta
Air Lines’ OpenDM adoption date. 𝛿𝑗 , 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 , and
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 are airline specific, week specific, and
day of week fixed effects.

4

We conducted a relative time model analysis, and the results
showed that there is no significant pre-treatment differences between
the treatment and control groups, suggesting our choice of control
group is appropriate.

3.4. Empirical Results
We use data three months before Delta’s OpenDM
shock to three months after the shock for our empirical
analysis. The DiD analysis results are shown in
Table 3. From Column 1 of
Table 3 we can see that the tweets Delta Air Lines
received after allowing OpenDM are significantly more
likely to be complaints. Interestingly, Column 4 of
Table 3 shows that the number of non-complaint tweets
decreased significantly after Delta Air Line’s OpenDM
shock, while the number of complaint tweets did not
change significantly, as shown in Column 3 of
Table 3. This indicates that after the introduction of an
alternative communication channel, customers who
complain about airline companies tend to keep using the
public channel. Only those tweets looking for
information seem to shift to the private channel. As a
result, the percentage of complaint tweets among all
tweets sent to the airlines increased after the airlines
enabled OpenDM, as can be seen in Column 5 of
Table 3. This indicates that, despite airlines’
attempt to encourage customers to complain privately
by enabling OpenDM, customers are “stubborn” and
still choose to complain publicly.

4. Study 2: Field Experiment
One advantage for customers to seek customer
service on social media is the fact it is by default
public—customers are able to communicate with
companies directly and openly on social media
platforms such as Twitter such that other users are also
able to see how companies handle their customer service.
Therefore, the addition of direct message (DM) as an
alternative communication channel is an interesting
departure from the more typical social media
communication in the sense that DM takes place in
private, so that customers can provide more personal
information while companies do not face as much
scrutiny from the general public. As such, DM
resembles the more traditional way of customer service
where complaints are generally invisible to the public.
From the company’s perspective, it might be beneficial
to encourage customers to compliment in public and
complain in private, so the public sentiment stays high,
which creates a positive word-of-mouth, and complaints
can be resolved privately. However, since complaints
sent through the private channel are kept out of the
public eye, companies might be less inclined to exert
effort in resolving issues. If companies’ motivation to
5

This dummy variable is included along with week dummies and
day of week dummies because the adoption day is on a Thursday,
rather than a Sunday.
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encourage private channel is to reduce potentially
negative sentiment, then we can expect companies to
have different response strategies for complaints versus
non-complaints, and public channel versus private
channel. To understand companies’ motivation to
encourage the private channel, we conduct a
randomized field experiment on a popular social media
platform, which allows us to examine how companies
prioritize their responses to customers seeking help
through the public channel and the private channel. This
experiment will help us better understand companies’
response strategies and their motivation to provide the
private channel as an alternative communication
channel.

4.1. Experiment Design
Our experiment consists of four experimental
conditions (C1-C4) based on the message type—
complaint or non-complaint—and the communication
channel—public or private. The conditions are listed in
Table 4. These four conditions will help us understand
how companies respond to complaint versus noncomplaint messages sent through public versus private
channels.
Our experiment uses a popular social media
platform and eight B2C companies. We selected 100
non-complaint messages and 100 complaint messages
from a data set of historical messages collected from the
social media platform. Out of the 100 non-complaint
messages we randomly selected 50 of them to create
non-complaint messages to be sent privately (C1), and
the rest 50 to send publicly (C3). Similarly, out of the
100 complaint messages we randomly selected 50 of
them to create complaint messages to be sent through
the private channel (C2) and the rest 50 to be sent
through the public channel (C4). For each message we
manually created eight versions so that all eight
companies would receive essentially identical messages
except for the company’s name. This helps ensure that
all eight companies receive the same treatments.
To operationalize the above experiment design as
cleanly as possible, we enlisted 800 existing accounts on
this social media platform to send messages. As we
planned to send 200 messages (50 messages for each
experimental condition) to each of the 8 companies, we
utilized all 800 accounts and made sure that each
account only sent one public message to a company and
one private message to a different company, so
companies would not suspect the authenticity of the
social media accounts used and the messages sent. The
assignments of social media accounts to messages and
6

We conduct t-tests and linear regressions to explore if the delivery
rates vary among different types of messages.
7
Social media customer service is considered time sensitive. In our
experiment data, if responded, a company’s response time is within

those accounts to companies were all randomly
determined.

4.2. Experiment Schedule
To control for potential time effects such as any
patterns across different days of a week and different
hours of a day, we developed a randomized messagesending schedule as follows:
1. A week is divided into thirty-minute blocks,
resulting in 336 thirty-minute blocks in one week.
2. For each thirty-minute block we generated a
random integer between 0 and 1799 to represent the
specific second within the thirty-minute block a
message should be sent. This resulted in 336 candidate
time points within one week.
3. For each company, since we planned on
sending 200 messages throughout the experiment, we
randomly picked 200 out of the 336 candidate time
points as the final messaging time to send these 200
messages. The ordering of these 200 messages were also
randomized, ensuring that a company received a
sequence of treatment conditions in a random order.
4. We repeated steps 1 - 3 above for each
company. Since each company required 200 messaging
times, we randomly generated a total of 1600 time
points. Due to some technical consideration, these 1600
time points were randomly generated in a way that none
of the 1600 messages shared the exact same messaging
time.
We followed our message-sending schedule to send
a total of 1600 messages to the eight companies, out of
which, 1533 messages were successfully delivered in
the end. Note that there is no significant difference in
the delivery success rates across the four experiment
conditions. 6 For each of the successfully delivered
messages, we kept track of whether or not the company
replied to it;7 if replied, we also recorded the duration
between our message time and the company’s response
time.

4.3. Experiment Results
Among the 1533 messages delivered, 1234 were
replied by the eight companies. The reply ratio for each
treatment condition is shown in Table 5. We can see that
complaints sent publicly have a lower reply ratio, while
the other three conditions have similar and higher reply
ratios.
We formally compare these reply ratios by t-tests,
shown in Table 6. We can see that in both t-test with
equal variance and t-test without equal variance, public
complaint messages have a lower reply ratio than
half an hour. Therefore, we marked a message as ‘not replied’ if the
company did not respond to the message within 5 days.

Page 6642

private complaint messages. Specifically, the private
complaint messages are roughly 17% more likely to be
replied to compared with public complaints. We also
find that public complaint messages have a lower reply
ratio than public non-complaint messages (noncomplaint messages sent via the public channel are 18%
more likely to be replied to compared with complaint
messages sent by the public channel.)
We then analyze the experiment data using linear
probability, logit, and probit models, shown in Table 7.
The dependent variable in all models is whether a
message was replied to. C2, C3, and C4 are dummy
variables indicating the message’s treatment condition.
Control variables include the total number of public
messages the companies received within the same hour
our message was sent (log_received), the inferred
gender of each social media account (ismale) used to
send the message based on each social media account’s
displayed name, time-fixed effects including the hour of
day and the day of week, and company-fixed effects.
The results across different model specifications all
show that there is no significant differences in reply
ratio among conditions C1, C2, and C3, while messages
in C4 are significantly less likely to be replied to,
according to the results of F tests. This finding suggests
that companies tend to discriminate against customers
who voice their complaints using the public channel. As
expected, we also find that the overall response rate goes
down as the number of public messages received by a
company (log_received) increases.
Among messages that were replied to, we also
analyze the duration between the time a message was
sent and the time the message was responded by the
company, measured in seconds. The duration for each
treatment condition is shown in Table 8, and the
corresponding two-sample t-tests are shown in Table 9.
The results show that companies responded to public
complaints significantly slower than they responded to
private complaints, which further suggest that
companies prioritize private complaints over public
complaints.
We also specified regression models to analyze the
reply time for the 1234 messages that were replied to.
Specifically, we use OLS with natural-logarithmtransformed reply time as the dependent variable; The
regression results are shown in Table 10. We can see
that companies responded to private complaints faster
than all other treatment condition, again suggesting
companies prioritize private complaints over public
complaints.
Overall, our field experiment results show that
companies are less likely to respond to public
complaints; even when replied, the response time
associated with public complaints are longer.
Meanwhile, we did not observe any difference in reply
ratio between public non-complaint messages and

private non-complaint messages, nor did we observe
any difference in reply time between public noncomplaint messages and private non-complaint
messages. This suggests that the different patterns we
observed in reply ratio between public complaints and
private complaints are not driven by the communication
channel itself; rather, companies appeared to have
strategically avoided or delayed responding to public
complaints. One potential explanation for this strategy
is that companies might be trying to discourage
customers from complaining publicly by delaying or
avoiding responses, in the hope that customers would be
motivated to utilize the private channel for complaints.
At the same time, companies also try to shorten the reply
time for private complaints, as shown in Table 10, so
customers might find it beneficial to adopt the private
channel for complaints. The companies’ strategy, if
successful, will help companies maintain a positive
sentiment on social media platforms. In addition, by not
replying to public complaints, companies can avoid
further publicizing negative sentiments because on this
social media platform, only public complaints that are
replied to will appear on the company’s home page. In
other words, customers’ public complaint will not be
immediately visible to other customers perusing the
company’s home page if the public complaints are left
un-replied, so by not replying to complaint messages
companies can reduce the size of the negative word-ofmouth. In conclusion, our experiment results suggest
that companies might be trying to convert the more
public social media customer service back to the
traditional style where complaints are made in private,
so as to avoid the risk of negative word-of-mouth.

5. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the choice between public
and private channels of customer service interaction on
social media, both from customers’ and brands’
perspectives. Through a natural experiment, we found
that complaining customers prefer to do so publicly
while some non-complaining customers prefer to
communicate privately. Through a randomized field
experiment, we found that firms prioritize complaints
sent through the private channel over complaints sent
through the public channel, as shown in the lower
response rate and longer response time for public
complaints. Such a prioritization is absent for noncomplaint messages. Hence, we conclude that firms,
being aware of the risk of subjecting its customer service
under public scrutiny, prefer complaints communicated
privately and seem to nudge customers towards
switching back to the traditional mode of customer
service. The diverging preferences of the two sides
towards open voice and private message suggests a tug
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of war between the traditional delivery of customer
service featuring brand control and social media
customer service featuring transparency and openness.
Our analysis shows that firms’ social media
strategy seems to focus on an image-first mindset,
where firms attempt to manage their image by
maintaining a high public sentiment on social media
sites. This can lead to their unwillingness to respond to
negative contents so as not to further publicize their
service failures. However, such image-first mindset
does not seem sustainable in the current social media era
as customers begin to demand accountability and
transparency online and prefer voicing complaints
publicly. This suggests that an image-first mindset leads
to more harm than good for firms. Therefore, instead of
an image-first mindset, we recommend that firms adopt
a solution-first mindset, where firms strive to address
customer complaints regardless of the communication
channel. A solution-first mindset encourages firms to
address complaints in a timely manner, minimizing the
risk of additional complaints. Furthermore, such
instances of successful complaint resolution can be
observed by the public and might even improve their
public image. We therefore believe that the solutionfirst mindset will ultimately be advantageous to firms’
successful social media complaint management.
As the first study revealing this interesting hidden
phenomenon, we believe this paper significantly
contributes to our understanding of the promises and
challenges of social media customer service.
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Tables
Table 1. Performance of the SVM classifier on 3700 tweets using 10-fold vross validation
Accuracy
Fold 1
Fold 2
Fold 3
Fold 4
Fold 5
Fold 6
Fold 7
Fold 8
Fold 9
Fold 10
Average

0.80
0.78
0.76
0.77
0.81
0.76
0.81
0.71
0.79
0.82
0.78

Precision
(+)

Recall
(+)

0.68
0.77
0.78
0.80
0.81
0.83
0.78
0.74
0.75
0.77
0.77

F1
(+)

0.70
0.66
0.63
0.62
0.69
0.61
0.65
0.50
0.62
0.67
0.64

0.69
0.71
0.70
0.70
0.75
0.70
0.71
0.60
0.68
0.72
0.70

Precision
(-)
0.85
0.78
0.75
0.76
0.81
0.73
0.82
0.69
0.81
0.84
0.78

Recall
(-)

F1

0.84
0.86
0.87
0.89
0.89
0.90
0.90
0.87
0.89
0.90
0.88

AUC
(-)
0.84
0.82
0.81
0.82
0.85
0.81
0.86
0.77
0.85
0.87
0.83

0.77
0.77
0.77
0.78
0.81
0.78
0.80
0.72
0.78
0.81
0.78

Note: This table reports the SVM classifier’s performance. The (+) symbol represents the positive case (complaints),
and the (-) symbol represents the negative case (non-complaints).

Table 2. Summary statistics
Variables
If_complaint
Log_followers

Num_tweets
Num_complaint
Num_noncomplai
nt

Description
If the first tweet in the dialogue
is a complaint or not
Log(number of followers for
the user who initiated the
dialogue)
Daily number of tweets
received
Daily number of complaint
tweets received
Daily number of noncomplaint tweets received

obs
770,705

mean
0.556

s.d.
0.497

max

min

770,705

5.559

2.258

17.418

728

1058.661

599.792

8980

305

728

588.937

365.461

3207

103

728

469.724

382.607

7466

176

1

0
0

Table 3. Main estimation results for Delta Air Lines
Dialogue
If_complaint
Treatment*after
after
Weekday fixed effects
Week fixed effects
Airlines fixed effects
Constant
Obs

0.351***
(0.0921)
-0.0166
(0.0927)
yes
yes
yes
1.120***
(0.0526)
770,705

Daily number of dialogues (log)
All
Complaint
Non_complaint
-0.0612
(0.0478)
-0.0252
(0.0482)
yes
yes
yes
7.203***
(0.0376)
728

0.0366
(0.0518)
-0.0614
(0.0502)
yes
yes
yes
6.947***
(0.0450)
728

-0.192***
(0.0596)
0.0194
(0.0521)
yes
yes
yes
5.815***
(0.0449)
728

Proportion of
Complaint
Tweets
0.0549***
(0.0120)
-0.0195**
(0.00879)
yes
yes
yes
0.760***
(0.0120)
728

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Experiment design
non-complaint
private noncomplaints (C1)
public noncomplaints (C3)

private channel
public channel

complaint
private complaints (C2)
public complaints (C4)

Table 5. Reply ratio for each treatment condition
reply ratio (# of messages)
private channel
public channel

non-complaint
0.8560(389)
0.8329(389)

complaint
0.8241(381)
0.7032(374)

Table 6. Results of two-sample T-tests

complaints:
mean(public channel)-mean(private channel)
non-complaints:
mean(public channel)-mean(private channel)
private channel:
mean(non-complaint)-mean(complaint)
public channel:
mean(non-complaint)-mean(complaint)

T statistic
With equal variances
-0.1209***
(-3.949)
-0.02314
(-0.8897)
0.02642
(1.207)
0.1297***
(4.297)

Without equal variances
-0.1209***
(-3.942)
-0.02314
(-0.8897)
0.02642
(1.206)
0.1297***
(4.280)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7. Regression analysis on companies’ reply decision

C2
C3
C4
log_received
ismale
Time fixed effects
Company fixed effects
constant
Obs
F test: C2=C4
F test: C3=C4

If_reply
LPM
-0.0328
(0.0258)
-0.0226
(0.0255)
-0.148***
(0.0287)
-0.0479***
(0.0128)
-0.0284
(0.0196)
yes
yes
1.214***
(0.0746)
1,533
15.03***
181.3***

logit
-0.270
(0.204)
-0.179
(0.206)
-0.965***
(0.191)
-0.344***
(0.0945)
-0.198
(0.138)
yes
yes
4.699***
(0.607)
1,533
14.26***
17.87***

probit
-0.149
(0.113)
-0.106
(0.115)
-0.564***
(0.109)
-0.191***
(0.0528)
-0.110
(0.0782)
yes
yes
2.642***
(0.332)
1,533
15.46***
18.12***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8. Reply time for each treatment condition
Log reply time in seconds (# of messages)
private channel
public channel

non-complaint
7.045 (333)
7.040 (324)

complaint
6.823 (314)
7.125 (263)

Table 9. Results of two-sample T-tests for reply time
Log(reply time)
complaints:
mean(public channel)-mean(private channel)
non-complaints:
mean(public channel)-mean(private channel)
private channel:
mean(non-complaint)-mean(complaint)
public channel:
mean(non-complaint)-mean(complaint)

T statistic
With equal variances
0.3013**
(1.834)
-0.04481
(-0.0275)
0.2215
(1.376)
-0.08424
(-0.5025)

Without equal variances
0.3013**
(1.838)
-0.04481
(-0.0275)
0.2215
(1.379)
-0.08424
(-0.5062)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10. Regression analysis on reply time

C2
C3
C4
log_received
ismale
Time fixed effects
Company fixed effects
constant
Obs

Reply time
OLS (natural log
transformed)
-0.240**
(0.101)
0.00973
(0.104)
0.0169
(0.111)
0.192***
(0.0508)
-0.0810
(0.0774)
yes
yes
6.252***
(0.290)
1,234

OLS
-2644.34**
(1350.44)
1909.28
(2407.70)
-2168.39
(1388.87)
3558.16**
(1532.45)
1212.45
(1455.04)
yes
yes
-17374.2**
(8417.65)
1,234

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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